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Making	Sense	of	Non-Individuals	in	Quantum	Mechanics		Jonas	R.	B.	Arenhart,	Otávio	Bueno,	and	Décio	Krause				 “It	is	only	a	slight	exaggeration	to	say	that	good	physics	has	at	times	been	spoiled	by	poor	philosophy.”	(Heisenberg	[1998],	p.	211)				
0.	Motivation		As	the	epigraph	by	Heisenberg	suggests,	physics	and	philosophy	may	both	benefit	from	a	beneficial	 exchange	 in	 which	 one	 may	 enlighten	 the	 other.	 Physics	 can	 illuminate	philosophy,	 and	 philosophy	 can	 illuminate	 physics.	 Of	 course,	 some	 may	 think	 that	philosophy	has	nothing	to	contribute	to	physics	(see	Weinberg	[1992]),	and	although	we	shall	not	provide	a	detailed	defense	of	why	we	take	philosophy	to	be	relevant	for	science	in	 general,	 we	 want	 to	 defend	 the	 relevance	 of	 ontology,	 as	 a	 field	 of	 metaphysics,	 to	physics	and	to	what	physics	is	about.	We	stress,	in	this	work,	through	a	case	study,	the	way	in	which	ontology,	as	a	philosophical	field,	can	engage	with	physics,	particularly	in	clearing	the	ground	for	the	understanding	of	the	nature	of	physical	reality.		Ontology	is	concerned	with	what	exists	and	with	what	kinds	of	things	exist.	Although	this	description	may	sound	abstract	and	far	from	the	concerns	of	physics,	the	relation	between	ontology	and	physics	is	a	close	one.	Of	course,	we	are	not	claiming	that	physics	cannot	be	successful	without	ontology.	If	that	were	the	case,	ontology	would	be	required	for	physics,	and	 it	 is	 not.	 However,	 physicists	 work	 with	 ontological	 problems	 all	 the	 time.	 For	instance,	 when	 it	 is	 claimed	 that,	 in	 general	 relativity,	 space	 and	 time	 are	 no	 longer	independent	and	that	a	new	kind	of	entity	is	required,	space-time,	this	is	a	physical	move	with	significant	ontological	consequences.	It	affects	directly	how	the	furniture	of	the	world	looks	like.		Physicists	need	not	be	concerned	with	ontological	problems	raised	by	physics,	just	as	one	need	 not	 be	 familiar	 with	 the	 Peano	 axioms	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 use	 arithmetical	operations.	 But	 the	 point	 is	 that	 ontology	 is	 part	 of	 the	 enterprise,	 shared	 by	 most	physicists,	 of	 obtaining	 information	 about	how	the	world	works	 and	what	 it	 is	made	of.	What	 kinds	 of	 things	 are	 there?	 Particles,	 fields,	 space,	 time?	 What	 are	 they	 like?	Answering	questions	like	these	is	part	of	the	articulation	of	an	understanding	of	physical	reality.	As	a	result,	the	furniture	of	the	world	is	involved	in	such	understanding.	Ignoring	those	 questions	 and	 their	 importance	may	 prevent	 one	 from	 getting	 closer	 to	 the	most	fundamental	problems.		In	this	work,	we	will	not	focus	on	such	general	questions,	but	rather	on	a	very	specific	case	study:	assuming	that	quantum	theories	deal	with	“particles”	of	some	kind	(point	particles	in	 orthodox	 non-relativistic	 quantum	 mechanics,	 field	 excitations	 in	 quantum	 field	theories),	what	kind	of	entity	can	such	particles	be?	One	possible	answer,	the	one	we	shall	examine	here,	 is	that	they	are	not	the	usual	kind	of	object	found	in	daily	life:	individuals.	Rather,	we	follow	a	suggestion	by	Erwin	Schrödinger¾among	others,	as	will	become	clear	below¾according	to	which	quantum	mechanics	poses	a	revolutionary	kind	of	entity:	non-
individuals.	While	 physics,	 as	 a	 scientific	 field,	 is	 not	 concerned	 with	 whether	 entities	posited	by	a	specific	physical	theory	are	individuals	or	not,	answering	this	question	is	part	
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of	the	quest	for	a	better	understanding	of	physical	reality.	Here	lies,	in	large	measure,	the	relevance	of	ontology.		
1.	Introduction		There	is	little	doubt	that	quantum	entities	are	difficult	to	categorize.	Quantum	mechanics	introduces	so	many	oddities	that	it	is	easier	to	state	what	quantum	entities	are	not	than	to	affirm	what	they	are.	(We	use	‘entity’	here	as	a	term	that	is	neutral	regarding	whether	the	things	 that	 are	 referred	 to	 have	 well-defined	 identity	 conditions	 or	 not.)	 According	 to	some	of	 the	 first	 creators	of	 quantum	 theory,	 quantum	entities	are	non-individuals.	This	view	is	now	known	as	the	Received	View	on	quantum	non-individuality	(henceforth,	for	the	sake	 of	 brevity,	 “Received	 View”;	 see	 French	 and	Krause	 [2006],	 Chapter	 3,	 for	 further	historical	details	on	the	view).		In	a	section	aptly	called	“A	particle	is	not	an	individual”,	Schrödinger	[1998]	advanced	one	of	the	formulations	of	the	Received	View.	One	passage	is	worth	quoting	in	full:			 This	essay	deals	with	the	elementary	particle,	more	particularly	with	a	certain	feature	that	this	 concept	 has	 acquired¾or	 rather	 lost¾in	 quantum	mechanics.	 I	mean	 this:	 that	 the	elementary	particle	is	not	an	individual;	it	cannot	be	identified,	it	lacks	“sameness”.	[…]	In	technical	language	it	is	covered	by	saying	that	the	particles	“obey”	a	new	fangled	statistics,	either	Bose-Einstein	or	Fermi-Dirac	statistics.	The	implication,	far	from	obvious,	is	that	the	unsuspected	epithet	“this”	is	not	quite	properly	applicable	to,	say,	an	electron,	except	with	caution,	in	a	restricted	sense,	and	sometimes	not	at	all.	(Schrödinger	[1998],	p.	197)		Several	significant	points	are	made	in	this	passage.	It	 is	noted	that	quantum	particles	(i)	are	 not	 individuals,	 (ii)	 cannot	 be	 identified,	 (iii)	 lack	 “sameness”,	 and	 (iv)	 cannot	 be	referred	 to	 by	 the	 use	 of	 “this”,	 at	 least	 not	 typically.	 Of	 course,	 it	 is	 not	 clear,	 by	considering	 this	 quotation	 alone,	 what	 Schrödinger’s	 conception	 of	 identification,	individuality,	 and	 sameness	 ultimately	 is,	 nor	 is	 it	 specified	 what	 the	 proper	 relations	among	 these	 concepts	 are.	 But	 a	 central	 feature	 of	 his	 view	 becomes	 salient	 in	 another	important	passage.	He	notes:		 I	beg	to	emphasize	this	and	I	beg	you	to	believe	it:	it	is	not	a	question	of	our	being	able	to	ascertain	the	identity	in	some	instances	and	not	being	able	to	do	so	in	others.	It	is	beyond	doubt	 that	 the	 question	 of	 “sameness”,	 of	 identity,	 really	 and	 truly	 has	 no	 meaning.	(Schrödinger	[1996],	pp.	121-122)		Here,	 it	 is	 emphasized	 that	 the	 very	 question	 of	 the	 identity	 of	 quantum	 entities,	 the	question	of	 their	 “sameness”,	 has	no	meaning.	As	a	 result,	 the	difference	between	 these	entities,	provided	their	sameness	is	meaningless,	has	no	meaning	either.	One	still	need	to	examine,	of	course,	what	exactly	is	the	relation	between	the	lack	of	sameness	(or	identity)	of	quantum	entities,	on	the	one	hand,	and	their	lack	of	individuality,	on	the	other.	It	seems	that	Schrödinger	takes	them	all	to	be	conceptually	the	same:	to	“lose”	one’s	individuality	just	is	to	lose	one’s	identity.	On	his	view,	the	question	of	the	identity	of	quantum	particles	in	 general	 makes	 no	 sense.	 The	 proper	 understanding	 of	 the	 relations	 between	 these	concepts,	and	the	kind	of	view	that	results	from	them	in	the	context	of	quantum	particles,	is	the	topic	of	this	paper.		These	 issues	 were	 also	 central	 to	 another	 contributor	 to	 the	 development	 of	 quantum	theory.	 In	 a	 classical	 passage,	 in	 which	 the	 issues	 of	 identity	 and	 individuality	 were	prominent,	Hermann	Weyl	points	out	that:		 […]	the	possibility	that	one	of	the	identical	twins	Mike	and	Ike	is	 in	the	quantum	state	E1	and	the	other	in	the	quantum	state	E2	does	not	include	two	differentiable	cases	which	are	
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permuted	 on	 permuting	Mike	 and	 Ike;	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	 either	 of	 these	 individuals	 to	retain	his	 identity	so	that	one	of	them	will	always	be	able	to	say	 ‘I’m	Mike’	and	the	other	‘I’m	 Ike’.	 Even	 in	 principle	 one	 cannot	 demand	 an	 alibi	 of	 an	 electron!	 (Weyl	[1950],	p.	241)		The	questions	of	discernibility	and	of	an	“alibi”	of	a	quantum	particle	is	clearly	posed.	Once	quantum	particles,	 such	as	 electrons,	 are	 in	an	 entangled	state,	 it	 cannot	be	determined	which	 particle	 is	 in	 which	 state.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 cannot	 be	 settled	 which	 particle	 is	which.	There	is	nothing¾no	property,	no	special	ingredient¾that	could	act	as	an	alibi	to	discern	electrons.	In	this	respect,	it	is	their	indiscernibility	rather	than	their	identity	that	should	 take	 center	 stage.	 Differently	 from	what	 Schrödinger	 suggests,	 perhaps	 identity	need	 not	 lose	 its	 meaning,	 provided	 that	 indiscernible	 things	 can	 still	 be	 numerically	distinct	(or	identical).	As	will	becomes	clear,	to	articulate	this	proposal	it	is	required	that	identity	and	indiscernibility	be	distinguished.	In	classical	logic	and	standard	mathematics,	identity	is	formulated	in	terms	of	indiscernibility.	So,	in	order	to	keep	one	and	change	the	other,	one	needs	to	resist	this	identification	and	clearly	separate	the	two	notions.	(We	will	return	to	this	below.)		As	these	quotations	illustrate,	when	it	comes	to	the	investigation	of	the	nature	of	quantum	entities,	various	possibilities	are	open.	One	can	examine	 the	commonalities	between	the	conceptions	underlying	Schrödinger’s	and	Weyl’s	approaches	or	pursue	their	differences.	A	major	feature	that	is	common	to	both	is	that	they	seem	to	suggest	that	something	is	lost	by	 quantum	 entities:	 something	 that	marks	 a	 difference	 between	 quantum	 entities	 and	classical	entities.		In	this	paper,	we	address	the	articulation	of	the	Received	View	and	the	conception	of	non-individuality	 that	 it	 attributes	 to	 quantum	 entities.	 As	 we	 discuss	 in	 Section	 2,	 the	conception	 can	 be	 formulated	 in	 distinct	 ways,	 some	 more	 radical,	 others	 more	conservative,	at	least	with	regard	to	the	role	of	the	concept	of	identity	as	used	in	quantum	theories.	 The	 main	 issue	 turns	 on	 the	 behavior	 of	 identity	 and	 its	 relation	 with	individuality.	 Central	 to	 the	 Received	 View	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 identity	makes	no	 sense,	 a	claim	that,	as	just	noted,	Schrödinger	seems	to	have	favored.	We	discuss,	in	Section	3,	how	to	make	metaphysical	 sense	 of	 that	 idea.	 The	 bare	 claim	 that	 identity	makes	 no	 sense	should	 be	 accompanied	 by	 an	 account	 of	 how	 this	 view	 entails	 that	 particles	 are	 not	individuals.	 In	 Section	4,	we	discuss	 the	 formal	 consequences	of	 the	 idea,	and	apply	 the	Received	 View	 to	 suggest	 a	 revision	 of	 classical	 logic.	 In	 Section	 5,	 we	 draw	 some	consequences	 of	 this	 case	 study	 to	 the	 significance	 of	 research	 in	 the	 foundations	 of	physics.		
2.	The	Received	View		Common	to	the	claims	of	both	Schrödinger	and	Weyl	quoted	above	is	an	important	point:	what	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 strange	 metaphysical	 behavior	 of	 quantum	 particles	 is	 the	statistics	 they	 obey.	 Behind	 this	 trait	 one	 finds	 encapsulated	 the	 so-called	 permutation	symmetry	(PS).	According	to	PS,	quantum	states	should	be	symmetric	(or	anti-symmetric)	with	regard	to	the	permutation	of	labels	of	particles.	As	a	result,	 if	we	are	to	represent	a	system	composed	by	two	particles	x1	and	x2,	so	that	one	of	the	particles	is	in	a	region	A	and	the	other	 is	 in	a	 region	B,	 it	 cannot	be	determined	which	particle	 is	 in	which	 region.	 (A	qualification	 is	 in	 order:	 assuming	 that	 the	 underlying	 “space”	 is	 Newtonian	 and	 thus,	mathematically,	its	topology	is	Hausdorff,	it	follows	that	two	separate	points	can	always	be	discerned	 by	 disjoint	 open	 balls	 centered	 on	 the	 points;	 see	 Krause	 [forthcoming].	Attention	to	the	interface	between	the	mathematical	framework	and	the	physical	setup	is	important.)	In	this	case,	non-symmetric	wave	functions,	ΨA(x1)ΨB(x2)	or	ΨA(x2)ΨB(x1),	are	unable	to	describe	the	situation	alone;	what	is	needed	is	a	superposition	of	both	of	them:	
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ΨAB	=	ΨA(x1)ΨB(x2)	±	ΨA(x2)ΨB(x1),	except	for	a	normalization	factor.		Thus,	the	permutation	of	A	with	B	results	either	in	the	same	state	ΨAB	in	the	case	of	bosons	or	in	the	state	-ΨAB	in	the	fermions’	case.	(See	French	and	Krause	[2006],	Chapter	4,	for	a	discussion	 of	 the	 physical	 aspects	 of	 this	 situation	 and	 an	 examination	 of	 how	 far	 the	metaphysics	can	go.)	More	importantly,	the	square	of	the	resulting	wave	function,	which	gives	us	the	relevant	probabilities,	is	preserved	(since	|ΨAB|2	=	|-ΨAB|2).	Hence,	if	A	stands	for	an	arbitrary	observer	and	P	is	a	permutation	operator,	then		 .		As	it	turns	out,	this	is	as	far	as	one	can	go	based	on	the	quotes	given	above.	Any	additional	steps	will	break	the	shared	agreement,	given	that	different	metaphysical	conclusions	will	be	made	in	light	of	the	same	physical	fact.		In	both	of	his	claims	above,	Schrödinger	seems	to	identify	“sameness”	and	identity,	so	that	the	 fact	 that	 one	 cannot	attribute	 sameness	 to	 the	particles	also	means	 that	 one	 cannot	attribute	 identity	 to	 them.	 Individuality	 is	 lost	as	a	result	of	 the	 lack	of	sameness.	Given	that	it	makes	no	sense	to	state	that	one	particle	is	the	same	as	the	other	and	given	that	it	is	not	possible	refer	to	a	particle	as	“this”	one,	particles	are	no	longer	individuals.		Of	course,	the	issue	is	more	complex	than	these	considerations	suggest.	If	it	were	possible	to	determine	that	there	is	one	particle	and	then	another,	it	would	certainly	make	sense	to	state	that	they	are	different.	But	this	is	not	quite	what	Schrödinger	claims.	At	this	point,	an	additional	 ingredient	 should	 be	 added	 to	make	 clear	 what	 Schrödinger’s	 conception	 of	individuality	 ultimately	 is.	 With	 regard	 the	 typical	 principle	 of	 individuality	 of	 the	metaphysicians,	which	 accounts	 for	what	 an	 entity	 is	 in	 contrast	 to	others,	 Schrödinger	advances	 a	particular	 space-time	 principle	 of	 individuation,	 one	which	 accounts	 for	 the	individuality	 of	 an	 item	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 spatiotemporal	position	 (see	 French	 and	Krause	[2006],	Chapter	1,	for	details).		In	discussing	the	individuality	of	familiar	objects,	Schrödinger	([1998],	p.	204)	claims	that	science	 has	 taken	 for	 granted	 the	 permanence	 of	 pieces	 of	 matter,	 and	 this	 is	 what	accounts	 for	 the	 identity	 and	 individuality	 of	 objects.	 This	 is	 manifested	 in	 one’s	confidence	when	the	identity	of	familiar	objects	becomes	an	issue:		 When	 a	 familiar	 object	 reenters	 our	 ken,	 it	 is	 usually	 recognized	 as	 a	 continuation	 of	previous	 appearances,	 as	 being	 the	 same	 thing.	 The	 relative	 permanence	 of	 individual	pieces	 of	 matter	 is	 the	 most	 momentous	 feature	 of	 both	 everyday	 life	 and	 scientific	experience.	If	a	 familiar	article,	 say	an	earthenware	 jug,	disappears	 from	your	room,	you	are	 quite	 sure	 somebody	must	 have	 taken	 it	 away.	 If	 after	 a	 time	 it	 reappears,	 you	may	doubt	whether	it	really	is	the	same	one¾breakable	objects	in	such	circumstances	are	often	not.	You	may	not	be	able	to	decide	the	issue,	but	you	will	have	no	doubt	that	the	doubtful	sameness	 has	 an	 indisputable	 meaning¾that	 there	 is	 an	 unambiguous	 answer	 to	 your	query.	(Schrödinger	[1998],	p.	204)		Compare	 the	view	articulated	 in	this	passage	with	the	one	Schrödinger	advanced	earlier	when	he	claimed	that	the	notion	of	identity	makes	no	sense	for	quantum	entities	(see	the	quotation	from	Schrödinger	[1996],	pp.	121-122,	in	the	previous	section).	While	ordinary	objects	typically	are	supposed	to	have	well-defined	identity	conditions,	which	allows	one	to	 answer	 questions	 about	 their	 identity	 over	 time	 (even	 if,	 in	 some	 cases,	 one	may	 be	unable	to	decide	the	issue),	for	quantum	objects	such	questions	do	not	even	make	sense.	As	a	result,	there	is	simply	no	fact	of	the	matter	regarding	the	individuality	(as	well	as	the	
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identity	 or	 sameness)	 of	 quantum	 particles.	 In	 fact,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 quantum	 particles,	situations	 involving	 distinct	 observations	 of	 an	 object	 through	 time	 generate	 problems	that	prevent	the	individuality	of	the	items	in	question	from	making	sense.	As	Schrödinger	notes:		 Even	if	you	observe	a	similar	particle	a	very	short	time	later	at	a	spot	very	near	to	the	first,	and	even	if	you	have	every	reason	to	assume	a	causal	connection	between	the	first	and	the	second	observation,	there	is	no	true,	unambiguous	meaning	in	the	assertion	that	 it	 is	the	same	particle	you	have	observed	in	the	two	cases.	The	circumstances	may	be	such	that	they	render	 it	 highly	 convenient	 and	 desirable	 to	 express	 oneself	 so,	 but	 it	 is	 only	 an	abbreviation	of	speech;	for	there	are	other	cases	where	the	“sameness”	becomes	entirely	meaningless	[…].	(Schrödinger	[1996],	p.	121)		Schrödinger	highlights	the	need	for	identity	in	order	to	claim	that	an	entity	is	observed	in	distinct	places	at	distinct	times.	It	is	then	just	one	step	to	add	that	without	the	possibility	that	a	particle	observed	at	one	instant	of	time	t1	is	the	same	as	a	particle	observed	at	a	later	time	t2,	individuality	is	lost.	Given	that,	on	this	view,	it	makes	no	sense	to	state	that	those	particles	are	the	same	(or	different),	identity	loses	its	meaning.	As	we	have	already	noted,	identity,	individuality,	and	sameness	are	taken	as	conceptually	the	same	by	Schrödinger.		Based	on	these	considerations,	a	straightforward	version	of	 the	Received	View	emerges.	Quantum	 particles	 are	 not	 individuals	 given	 that	 they	 have	 no	 well-determined	trajectories	in	space-time,	and	it	is	not	possible	to	identify	distinct	detections	of	an	entity	as	being	detections	of	the	same	entity.	(We	will	return	to	this	view	in	the	next	section	and	will	provide	additional	details	there.)		However,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 only	 way	 to	 articulate	 the	 Received	 View	 via	 space-time	continuity.	Another	form	is	to	keep	the	restriction	that	quantum	entities	fail	to	have	well-defined	 spatiotemporal	 trajectories	 (as	 is	 the	 case	 in	most	 versions	 of	 the	 theory),	 and	thus	insist	that	these	entities	are	non-individuals	in	this	sense,	but	not	connect	this	lack	of	individuality	 with	 a	 lack	 of	 identity.	 That	 is,	 one	 could	 keep	 a	 form	 of	 space-time	individuality,	 but	 separate	 individuality	 from	 the	 logical	 relation	 of	 identity	 (see	 the	suggestion	 in	 French	 and	 Krause	 [2006],	 p.	 153,	 and	 Arenhart	 [2017]).	 Perhaps	Schrödinger	 could	 be	 interpreted	 as	 suggesting	 this	 view:	 identity	 does	 not	 apply	 to	quantum	 particles,	 but	 this	 is	 no	 violation	 of	 the	 Principle	 of	 Identity	 of	 Indiscernibles	(PII),	according	to	which	some	quality	always	discerns	numerically	distinct	 items.	Since,	on	this	view,	PII	is	supposed	to	apply	only	to	individuals,	which	quantum	particles	are	not,	such	 particles	 do	 not	 provide	 a	 violation	 of	 the	 principle.	 Along	 these	 lines,	 another	version	of	the	Received	View	could	be	advanced,	along	with	a	distinc	conception	of	non-individual.		But	 another	 option,	 which	 is	 less	 revisionary	 regarding	 the	 role	 of	 identity	 than	Schrödinger’s,	can	still	be	pursued.	One	can	take	literally	the	claim	that	quantum	particles	are	 non-individuals	 but	 resist	 to	 follow	 Schrödinger	 in	 making	 the	 further	 claim	 that	identity,	as	a	logical	relation,	loses	its	meaning.	In	fact,	if	Weyl’s	“alibi”	is	taken	to	refer	to	a	principle	 of	 individuality,	 then	 it	 makes	 sense	 to	 claim	 that	 even	 though	 no	 alibi	 is	available	 for	quantum	particles,	 this	lack	of	alibi	need	not	be	connected	with	 the	 lack	of	meaning	of	 identity	 (hence,	 identity	would	be	metaphysically	deflated,	as	recommended	by	Bueno	[2014]).	 In	order	 to	do	 that,	 it	 is	enough	that	one	resists	binding	so	 tightly	an	item’s	individuality	with	its	identity.	Let	us	explore	this	option	further,	given	that	pursuing	this	 route	 provides	 an	 additional	 (alternative)	 version	 of	 the	 Received	 View.	 (See	 also	Arenhart	[2017]	for	a	discussion	of	alternative	formulations	of	the	Received	View,	which	do	not	involve	abandoning	identity.)		
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One	can	take	the	alibi	Weyl	refers	to	as	involving	a	property	that	distinguishes	a	particle	bearing	it	from	any	other	particle.	It	is	always	possible	to	differentiate	a	classical	particle	(that	is,	a	particle	described	by	classical	mechanics)	from	another	particle	by	at	least	one	property.	Of	course,	it	cannot	be	a	state-independent	property	(given	that	particles	of	the	same	kind	share	such	properties),	but	at	least	their	spatiotemporal	location	distinguishes	them.	On	this	view,	no	two	classical	particles	occupy	the	same	location	at	the	same	time,	due	to	a	principle	of	impenetrability.	This	means	that	numerically	distinct	particles	have	their	 difference	 grounded	 in	 a	property	 that	 accounts	 for	 their	 numerical	 diversity	 and	their	individuality.		This	trait	leads	to	the	validity	of	PII	in	classical	mechanics.	According	to	this	principle,	as	noted	above,	numerically	distinct	particles	are	always	discernible	by	some	quality.	Entities	are	 individuals	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 once	 two	of	 them	are	present,	 there	 is	 always	 some	property	that	accounts	for	their	numerical	difference:	this	is	their	alibi.	In	light	of	PII,	an	alibi	 is	always	available	 in	 classical	mechanics.	As	a	 result,	 classical	particles	 are	 indeed	individuals.		In	contrast,	quantum	particles	have	no	alibi,	nothing	that	accounts	for	their	individuality.	Not	even	spatiotemporal	location	can	be	employed	to	this	effect.	Due	to	the	permutation	symmetry,	 quantum	 particles	 are	 indiscernible	 by	 their	 properties,	 including	 both	 state	dependent	 and	 state	 independent	 ones.	 Hence,	 the	 version	 of	 PII	 presented	 earlier,	according	 to	 which	 there	 is	 always	 some	 property	 that	 accounts	 for	 the	 numerical	diversity	of	particles,	fails	in	quantum	mechanics.	The	result	is	clear:	as	Weyl	noted,	there	is	 no	 alibi	 for	 quantum	 entities	 (see	 French	 and	 Krause	 [2006],	 Chapter	 4,	 for	 further	discussion).		It	could	be	argued	that	if	properties	are	unable	to	account	for	the	numerical	difference	of	quantum	particles,	perhaps	some	relations	could	do	that,	such	as	the	relation	“to	have	spin	opposite	to”	in	a	given	spatial	direction.	But	this	proposal	is	still	unable	to	account	for	the	particles’	 individuality.	After	all,	 if	x	has	spin	opposite	 to	y,	y	also	has	spin	opposite	 to	x	(the	 relation	 is	 symmetric).	While	no	particle	has	spin	opposite	 to	 itself	 (the	 relation	 is	irreflexive),	there	is	no	quantum	mechanical	fact	of	the	matter	to	determine	which	of	x	or	y	has	spin	up	 in	a	given	direction,	and	which	has	spin	down	 in	 that	same	direction.	Thus,	those	 relations,	 called	 weakly	 discernible	 relations,	 in	 principle	 can	 account	 for	 the	numerical	 diversity	 of	 the	 particles	 (although	 whether	 they	 do	 account	 for	 that	 is	 still	debatable;	 see	 French	 and	 Krause	 [2006],	 Chapter	 4).	 Despite	 that,	 they	 are	 unable	 to	provide	an	alibi	for	the	particles	in	question	since	weakly	discernible	relations	are	unable	to	individuate	such	particles.	Accounting	for	the	particles’	numerical	diversity	(if	at	all)	is	the	closest	one	can	get	in	quantum	mechanics	to	discernibility	(see	Muller	and	Saunders	[2008],	and	the	discussion	in	Lowe	[2016]).		However,	 if	 weakly	 discernible	 relations	 are	 implemented	 in	 a	 mathematical	 context	whose	 underlying	 set	 theory	 is	 ZFC	 (Zermelo-Fraenkel	 set	 theory	 with	 the	 axiom	 of	choice),	as	is	the	case	of	Muller	and	Saunders	[2008],	all	entities	become	fully	discernible	and	identifiable	in	virtue	of	the	resources	of	set	theory	alone.	(We	return	to	this	point	and	provide	 the	 argument	 below.)	 Thus,	 there	 is	 a	 tension	 between	 the	motivation	 for	 the	introduction	of	weakly	discernible	relations	and	the	adopted	set-theoretic	framework.		In	principle,	 if	the	option	of	maintaining	that	identity	holds	for	quantum	particles	can	be	fully	 worked	 out,	 one	 could	 claim	 that	 they	 are	 different	 or	 identical,	 without	 thereby	implying	that	 they	are	 individuals.	What	 is	 required,	as	we	have	been	suggesting,	 is	 that	their	 individuality	 be	 grounded	 in	 some	 kind	 of	 alibi	 (in	 Weyl’s	 sense)	 that	 is	 not	formulated	in	terms	of	identity.		
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There	 are	 additional	possibilities	 to	 articulate	 alibis	 (that	 is,	 principles	 of	 individuality)	without	 requiring	 the	 removal	 of	 identity	 (see	 Arenhart	 [2017]).	 It	 is	 enough	 that	 the	content	of	 identity	be	deflated	 from	 the	metaphysical	 content	 that	would	be	 required	 if	identity	 also	 played	 the	 role	 of	 a	 principle	 of	 individuality.	 (For	 a	defense	 that	 identity	should	be	deflated,	see	again	Bueno	[2014].)	As	will	become	clear	below	(when	a	formal	approach	to	identity	is	discussed),	identity	can	be	thought	of	as	something	very	minimal,	and	without	much	metaphysical	content,	just	in	terms	of	two	features:	reflexivity	(that	is,	every	object	is	identical	to	itself)	and	substitutivity	(if	x	is	identical	to	y,	then	if	x	is	F,	so	is	
y).	 One	 could	 add	 some	 metaphysical	 content	 to	 identity,	 so	 that	 it	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	principle	of	individuality.	But	that	changes	identity	by	making	it	more	substantive	than	it	needs	to	be.	Schrödinger,	of	course,	does	not	seem	to	follow	this	path	since	he	appears	to	keep	 identity	 and	 individuality	 very	 closely	 connected.	 As	 a	 result,	 insisting	 on	 non-individuality	requires	abandoning	identity,	at	 least	for	quantum	entities.	In	what	follows,	we	investigate	the	prospects	for	a	Schrödingerian	approach	to	non-individuality.		
3.	Making	Sense	of	Losing	Identity		If	 one	 is	 to	pursue	 the	option	 that	 seems	 to	be	 suggested	by	 Schrödinger¾namely,	 that	individuality	and	identity	go	together,	and	that	one	cannot	have	non-individuals	without	abandoning	 also	 the	 relation	 of	 identity¾it	 is	 crucial	 to	 explain	 in	 detail	 why	 identity	should	go	hand	in	hand	with	individuality	regarding	quantum	particles.		One	of	the	possible	ways	of	doing	that	consists	in	exploring	the	relation	between	identity	and	individuality	through	the	notion	of	haecceity,	as	it	is	done,	for	instance,	in	French	and	Krause	[2006].	Basically,	a	haecceity	is	a	non-qualitative	property	uniquely	instantiated	by	an	 object,	 something	 like	 an	 individual	 essence	 possessed	 by	 a	 single	 individual.	 Each	individual	has	its	own	essence,	which,	of	course,	accounts	for	its	individuality	(see	further	discussion	in	Lowe	[2003]).		Being	non-qualitative,	a	haecceity	does	not	count	as	a	quality	able	to	discern	among	two	individuals.	That	is,	two	individuals	may	share	every	qualitative	property,	but	still	not	be	the	 same	 individual,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 have	 distinct	 haecceities.	 As	 a	 result,	 PII	(restricted	to	qualitative	properties)	may	fail	and,	despite	that,	individuality	is	still	saved	in	light	of	a	haecceity.	In	this	sense,	having	a	haecceity	is	what	French	and	Krause	([2006],	Chapter	1)	call	a	“Transcendental	Individuality”	principle:	that	which	confers	individuality	over	and	above	an	item’s	qualities.		This	 point	 has	 an	 important	 formal	 counterpart.	 If	 the	 underlying	 mathematical	framework	in	which	quantum	theories	are	formulated	is	that	of	ZFC,	one	should	consider,	in	 particular,	 the	 resulting	models¾the	 structures	 in	 which	 quantum	mechanics	 holds.	Within	 these	structures,	 it	 is	possible	 that	certain	entities	cannot	be	discerned	based	on	the	resources	of	quantum	theories	alone.	However,	outside	such	structures,	it	is	possible	to	discern	 the	 entities	 in	 question,	 and	 this	 can	 be	 thought	 as	 a	 formal	 expression	 of	“transcendental	individuality”.	(Clearly,	the	relevant	structures	cannot	be	rigid.)		The	problem,	however,	is	not	to	account	for	an	item’s	individuality,	but	rather	for	its	non-individuality.	How	can	haecceity	achieve	that?	The	answer	seems	to	be:	through	the	notion	of	identity.	As	French	and	Krause	put	it:		 […]	 the	 idea	 is	 apparently	 simple:	 regarded	 in	 haecceistic	 terms,	 “Transcendental	Individuality”	can	be	understood	as	the	identity	of	an	object	with	itself;	that	is,	‘a	=	a’.	We	shall	 then	 defend	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 non-individuality	 can	 be	 captured	 in	 the	quantum	 context	 by	 formal	 systems	 in	which	 self-identity	 is	 not	 always	well-defined,	 so	
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that	 the	reflexive	 law	of	 identity,	namely,	"x	 (x	=	x),	 is	not	valid	 in	general.	 (French	and	Krause	[2006],	pp.	13-14)		That	is,	a	haecceity	may	be	formally	represented	by	self-identity.	Plato’s	individuality,	if	it	were	attributed	by	a	haecceity,	would	consist	in	his	bearing	the	property	of	being	identical	with	Plato.	This,	of	course,	is	a	non-qualitative	property,	and	it	is	able	to	connect	identity	(as	a	logical	concept)	and	individuality	(as	a	metaphysical	concept).	The	quote	above	also	provides	the	basic	idea	to	make	sense	of	non-individuality	within	a	framework	that	takes	into	account	the	Schrödingerian	claims	that	quantum	entities	are	not	individuals	and	that	identity	makes	no	sense	for	them.	In	order	to	accommodate	metaphysically	the	idea	that	identity	 has	 no	 meaning	 for	 quantum	 particles,	 it	 is	 enough	 that	 the	 reflexive	 law	 of	identity	fails	or	does	not	hold	in	general.	Thus,	not	everything	is	self-identical.	In	light	of	this	connection	between	self-identity	and	haecceity,	those	entities	for	which	the	law	fails	are	non-individuals:	they	lack	a	haecceity,	which	is	the	individuation	principle.		French	 and	 Krause	 acknowledge	 explicitly	 that	 the	 connection	 between	 identity	 and	individuality	is	particularly	tight:		 We	are	supposing	a	strong	relationship	between	individuality	and	identity	[…]	for	we	have	characterized	‘non-individuals’	as	those	entities	for	which	the	relation	of	self-identity	a	=	a	does	not	make	sense.	(French	and	Krause	[2006],	p.	248)		This	is	only	one	of	the	possible	ways	to	accommodate	metaphysically	the	combination	of	non-individuality	and	the	loss	of	identity.	This	proposal	allows	one	to	make	a	good	case	for	the	 failure	of	 identity,	 given	 that	 the	 relation	between	 individuality	 and	 identity	 is	 very	clearly	established	in	this	approach.	However,	 in	addition	to	burdening	identity	with	the	role	of	attributing	individuality,	there	is	another	disadvantage	of	adopting	this	approach	to	non-individuality:	 it	 takes	us	very	 far	 from	the	Schrödingerian	 ideas	we	started	with.	Of	course,	it	allows	us	to	make	sense	of	the	claim	that	identity	and	difference	do	not	apply	to	quantum	 entities.	 But	 the	 lack	 of	 haecceity	 arguably	 was	 not	 what	 Schrödinger	 had	 in	mind	 in	 his	 discussion	 of	 identity	 and	 identification	 of	 quantum	 particles.	 Rather,	 as	discussed	above,	he	seems	to	favor	an	account	of	individuality	framed	explicitly	in	terms	of	spatiotemporal	trajectories.		The	 following	 two	conditions	seem	to	articulate	better	 the	conception	of	an	entity	being	individuated	by	its	spatiotemporal	position,	in	the	sense	that	an	entity	satisfying	these	two	conditions	 should	 be	 counted	 as	 an	 individual	 (see	 also	 Bueno	 [2014]	 and	 Bueno	[forthcoming]):		 (A)	Identity	conditions:	an	individual	has	(clearly	determined)	identity	conditions.	(B)	Persistence	conditions:	an	individual	persists	over	time	(despite	changes).		Note	 that	 these	 minimal	 conditions	 are	 satisfied	 by	 what	 is	 typically	 considered	individuals	 (such	 as,	 chairs,	 cherries,	 or	 chariots).	 In	 particular,	 as	 Schrödinger	emphasizes,	an	earthenware	jug	would	be	an	individual	according	to	this	approach,	and	so	are	 classical	 particles,	 given	 that	 their	 well-determined	 trajectories	 grounds	 both	 their	persistence	 and	 their	 identity	 conditions	 (see	 French	 and	 Krause	 [2006],	 Chapter	 2).	Quantum	 particles	 in	 Bohmian	 mechanics	 are	 also	 individuals	 according	 to	 this	characterization:	they	have	trajectories	attributed	by	hidden	variables.		It	should	be	noted	that	there	are	at	least	two	ways	of	satisfying	persistence	condition	(B):		 (B.1)	Essential	traits:	as	long	as	certain	essential	traits	(or	necessary	properties)	of	an	individual	are	preserved,	the	individual	remains	in	existence.	
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(B.2)	 Closest	 continuers:	 given	 an	 individual	 i	 that	 satisfy	 condition	 (A),	 at	 each	moment	 of	 time	 the	 closest	 continuer	 individual	 to	 i	 (the	 one	 that	 shares	most	properties	with	i)	is	taken	to	be	i	(Nozick	[1981],	Chapter	1).			Of	course,	a	haecceity	could	be	an	essential	trait,	and	in	this	way,	haecceities	could	be	used	to	 account	 for	 the	 permanence	 of	 an	 individual.	 Given	 that	we	 have	 already	 suggested	avoiding	a	theory	of	haecceities	to	account	for	individuality	and	to	frame	an	approach	to	non-individuality,	we	 favor	 the	 less	metaphysically	 committing	option	 (B.2).	The	 idea	 is	that	an	individual	persists	through	a	sequence	of	closest	continuers,	which,	taken	together,	account	for	the	permanence	of	an	individual	over	time	despite	the	changes	it	undergoes.		Given	 this	 theory	 of	 individuality	 (formulated	 by	 the	 conjunction	 of	 conditions	 (A)	 and	(B.2)),	 for	 something	 to	be	 a	non-individual,	 three	options	 emerge:	 condition	 (A)	 can	be	violated;	condition	(B.2)	can	be	undermined,	or	both	conditions	can	fail.	Quantum	entities,	as	 the	 discussion	 of	 Schrödinger’s	 view	 indicates,	 violate	 both	 conditions.	 This	 is	 a	Humean	 point:	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 no	 causal	 connection	 that	 would	 allow	 one	 to	determine	that	similar	objects	detected	in	different	moments	in	time	are,	in	fact,	the	same.	In	the	quantum	case,	consider	some	quantum	entities	that	have	no	continuous	trajectory.	One	 cannot	 look	 for	 a	 quantum	mechanical	 justification	 to	 connect	 two	 observations	 of	two	such	entities	 through	a	single	 trajectory.	Nothing	 in	 the	 theory	allows	us	 to	do	 that	(unless	one	is	a	Bohmian).	As	a	result,	as	we	have	seen,	Schrödinger	claimed	that	identity	makes	no	sense	 for	 those	entities,	given	 that	 there	 is	no	 fact	of	 the	matter	 to	determine	whether	the	two	observations	correspond	to	the	same	entity	or	not.	The	question	of	the	identity	of	the	observed	entities	ends	up	being	entire	ungrounded.		This	accounts	for	both	the	non-individuality	of	the	particles	and	the	fact	that	identity	does	not	apply	to	them.	This	metaphysical	picture	is	closer	to	what	Schrödinger	had	in	mind,	it	seems,	 and	 it	 is	 less	 inflated	 than	 the	one	 first	 suggested	by	French	and	Krause	 [2006],	which	proceed	 through	 the	 concept	of	 a	haecceity.	However,	 both	 approaches	 require	 a	corresponding	rejection	of	the	overall	validity	of	identity.	One	of	the	ways	to	accommodate	such	 a	 limitation	 of	 identity	 is	 through	 logics	 that	 restrict	 identity,	 the	 so-called	 “non-reflexive	logics”.	We	turn	to	them	now.		
4.	The	Formal	Approach	to	Identity		It	 is	 important	 to	 be	 clear	 about	 what	 identity	 is,	 particularly	 when	 it	 is	 stated	 that	quantum	 objects	 lack	 identity.	 Throughout	 this	 work,	 we	 have	 been	 using	 the	 term	“identity”	in	the	sense	of	what	is	typically	called	standard	identity	(or	simply	“identity”,	for	short)	as	conceptualized	by	classical	logic	and	standard	mathematics.		But	there	is	a	pre-theoretical	conception	of	identity	(let	us	call	it	a	numerical	identity,	for	lack	of	a	better	word).	This	conception	states	that	every	object	is	identical	just	to	itself	and	to	nothing	else.	According	to	this	informal	view,	when	it	is	coupled	with	the	tight	connection	
between	 identity	 and	 individuality	 just	 discussed,	 it	 follows	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 all	 objects	
have	identity	that	they	are	individuals.	So,	under	this	interpretation,	the	informal	notion	of	identity	is	closely	related	to	that	of	individuality.		The	informal	view	of	identity	discussed	above	is	generally	thought	to	be	encapsulated	in	classical	logic,	or	in	other	systems	of	logic,	which	share	the	basic	features	of	identity.	Let	us	focus	on	 classical	 logic,	 for	 the	 sake	of	 brevity.	 Classical	 logic	 takes	 identity	 as	 a	binary	relation	between	objects	of	the	domain.	Identity	statements	are	usually	written	as	a	=	b,	(or	as	a	¹	b,	depending	on	the	case),	in	order	to	express	that	the	objects	denoted	by	a	and	by	 b	 are	 the	 same,	 they	 are	 identical	 (or	 are	 not	 the	 same,	 they	 are	 different).	 This	intuitively	 means	 that	 there	 are	 no	 two	 objects,	 but	 just	 one,	 which	 can	 be	 named	
 10	
(described)	by	such	expressions.	A	typical	case	is	the	famous	identity	statement	“Hesperus	=	Phosphorus”	(Frege	[1960]).	True	statements	such	as	this	make	reference	to	the	identity	of	the	objects	of	the	domain,	and	‘Hesperus’	and	‘Phosphorus’	denote	the	same	object.	One	should	consider	both	the	syntactic	characterization	of	the	notion	of	identity	(given	by	the	binary	predicate	‘=’)	and	the	semantic	characterization	in	which	the	identity	of	the	objects	of	the	domain	of	interpretation	is	at	issue	(we	denote	the	domain	by	D).		Let	us	consider	the	semantics	first.	The	identity	of	D	is	taken	to	be	the	set	ID	=	{áx,	xñ:	x	Î	
D}.	This	clearly	presupposes	that	the	identity	of	the	elements	of	D	is	well	determined,	and	the	metamathematical	 framework	 is	consistent	with	 this	 fact.	 If	one	assumes	a	standard	
semantics,	 that	 is,	 a	 semantics	 built	 in	 a	 standard	 set	 theory	 such	 as	 ZFC,	 then	 this	assumption	is	met,	given	that	the	identity	of	all	sets	is	presupposed.	(We	will	return	to	this	point	below.)	ID	is	a	set.	According	to	Cantor,	it	is	thus	“a	collection	of	definite	and	distinct	objects	of	 our	 intuition	or	of	our	 thought”	 (Cantor	 [1955],	p.	85).	This	 informal,	 circular	idea	 of	 a	 set	 (of	 course,	 it	 is	 not	 a	 definition),	 which	 accounts	 for	 sets	 in	 terms	 of	collections,	is	couched	in	terms	of	numerical	identity.		The	 problem	 concerns	 the	 syntactic	 side.	 Is	 it	 possible	 to	 axiomatize	 a	 first-order	 logic	having	a	primitive	binary	predicate	for	identity	having	the	set	ID	as	its	sole	interpretation?	That	 is,	 is	 it	 possible	 to	 provide	 a	 definition	 (or	 a	 group	 of	 postulates)	 such	 that	 the	identity	predicate	has	just	ID	as	a	model?	The	answer,	we	argue,	is	negative.	Let	us	see	why.		To	begin	with,	it	is	important	not	to	confuse	numerical	identity	with	the	notion	of	identity	in	 standard	 logic	 and	 mathematics.	 Arguably,	 it	 is	 primarily	 the	 latter	 that	 can	 be	rigorously	dealt	with.	Suppose	that	the	language	L	under	consideration	is	first-order.	Two	cases	emerge.	First,	L	contains	just	a	finite	set	of	primitive	predicates.	In	this	case,	we	can	“define”	 identity	 by	 exhausting	 all	 predicates.	 An	 example	 suffices:	 suppose	 that	 the	predicates	are	two	monadic	predicates	P	and	Q	and	a	binary	predicate	R.	Thus,	a	=	b	can	be	“defined”	as	follows:		 (1)	a	=	b	«	(Pa	«	Pb)	Ù	(Qa	«	Qb)	Ù	"x	((Rxa	«	Rxb)	Ù (Rax	«	Rbx)).		The	problem	with	 this	 “definition”	 is	 that	 clearly	 there	 can	be	 additional	predicates	not	belonging	to	the	language	that	could	distinguish	a	and	b,	not	to	mention	the	possibility	of	there	being	some	kind	of	haecceity	that	achieves	that	(as	we	noted	in	the	beginning	of	the	previous	 section	 when	 we	 made	 the	 point	 about	 the	 “formal	 counterpart”	 regarding	haecceity).	 In	 fact,	 (1)	 stands	 only	 for	 the	 indiscernibility	 of	 a	 and	 b	 regarding	 the	predicates	of	L.		Second,	usually	first	order	languages	introduce	identity	as	a	primitive	binary	predicate	‘=’.	In	this	case,	the	standard	formulation	makes	use	of	two	postulates,	namely:			 (R)	Reflexivity:	"x	x	=	x	(S)	Substitutivity:	x	=	y	®	(ax	®	a[y/x]),	where	x	and	y	are	individual	variables,	ax	is	 a	 formula	 having	x	 free,	 and	a[y/x]	 results	 from	 the	 substitution	 of	 y	 for	 x	 in	some	free	occurrences	of	x,	in	which	x	and	y	are	distinct	variables.		(Note	the	use	of	identity	in	the	very	formulation	of	the	substitutivity	rule:	the	variables	x	and	 y	 need	 to	 be	 distinct,	 that	 is,	 not	 identical.)	 From	 these	 postulates,	 it	 follows	 that	identity	 is	 symmetric	 and	 transitive.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 an	 equivalence	 relation	 as	 well	 as	 a	congruence	relation	due	to	the	presence	of	substitutivity.	Logicians	say	that	identity	is	the	
finest	congruence	over	the	domain	in	the	sense	that	if	@	is	another	congruence,	then	a	=	b	entails	a	@	b,	for	all	a	and	b.	
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	But	things	are	not	so	easy.	Postulates	(R)	and	(S)	cannot	guarantee	that	the	interpretation	of	 the	 predicate	 ‘=’	 is	 the	 set	 ID.	 In	 fact,	 it	 can	 be	 shown	 that	 a	 congruence,	 other	 than	identity,	 can	 be	 defined	 over	 the	 domain	 that	 also	models	 the	 predicate	 of	 identity	 (da	Costa	and	Bueno	[2009];	Krause	and	Arenhart	[2018]).	In	other	words,	from	the	point	of	view	 of	 L,	 it	 cannot	 be	 known	 whether	 one	 is	 working	 with	 a	 structure	 where	 ‘=’	 is	interpreted	 as	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 domain	D,	 namely,	 the	 set	 ID,	 or	 in	 terms	 of	 another	structure	that	has	the	defined	congruence	as	the	interpretation	of	syntactic	identity.	These	structures	are	elementary	equivalent.		Leaving	first-order	languages	behind,	higher-order	languages	should	then	be	considered.	It	 suffices	 to	 consider	L	as	a	 second-order	 language	 (the	 generalization	 to	other	higher-order	languages	is	immediate).	In	this	case,	identity	can	be	(allegedly)	“defined”	in	terms	of	indiscernibility	(indistinguishability)	by	what	is	called	Leibniz	Law,	namely:		 (2)	x	=	y	if,	and	only	if,	"F	(Fx	«	Fy),		where	x	and	y	are	variables	for	individuals	and	F	is	a	variable	for	properties	of	individuals.	The	 right-side	of	 the	biconditional	 expresses	 the	 indiscernibility	of	x	and	y,	 and	 it	 states	that	the	objects	that	stand	for	x	and	y	have	the	same	properties	(hence	they	also	share	all	relations).		The	problem	now	is	with	the	semantics.	Suppose	that	the	domain	is	the	non-empty	set	D	=	{1,	 2,	 3,	 4,	 5}	 and	 that	 our	 second-order	 language	 has	 three	 monadic	 predicate	constants¾P,	 Q,	 R¾and	 two	 individual	 constants¾a	 and	 b.	 Consider	 the	 following	interpretation:	1	is	assigned	to	a	and	2	to	b.	Furthermore,	the	extensions	of	the	predicates	are	interpreted	as	the	following	sets:	A	=	{1,	2,	3},	B	=	{1,	2,	4},	and	C	=	{1,	2,	5}.	Thus,	since	1	and	2	belong	to	all	sets,	it	follows	that	a	and	b	have	all	properties	in	common.	In	other	words,	the	right-side	of	(2)	holds,	despite	the	fact	that	1	¹	2.		The	only	way	of	guaranteeing	that	(2)	will	have	its	full	 intuitive	meaning	is	to	add	to	the	semantics	all	subsets	of	D,	 that	is,	to	consider	what	Church	calls	principal	interpretations	(Church	[1956],	p.	307).	But	then,	as	is	well	known,	completeness	is	lost.		As	 these	 considerations	make	 clear,	 identity	 is	 not	 a	 simple	 concept	 when	 one	 tries	 to	provide	 a	 rigorous	account	of	 the	 intuitive	 idea.	But	 from	a	 logical	point	 of	 view,	 this	 is	what	 classical	 logic	 presents	 us	 with.	 Based	 on	 this	 theory	 of	 identity,	 which	 is	 called	
classical	 theory	 of	 identity	 (CTI),	we	 can	 consider	 stronger	 systems,	 such	 as	 various	 set	theories.		As	 is	well	 known,	 there	 are	 several	non-equivalent	 set	 theories	with	distinct	properties	and	which	yield	significantly	different,	and	even	incompatible,	theorems.	For	instance,	ZFC	includes	the	axiom	of	choice;	Quine-Rosser’s	NF	system	does	not:	 it	 is	incompatible	with	this	axiom	(Forster	[2014]).	In	ZFC,	if	consistent,	there	is	no	Russell	set,	namely,	R	=	{x:	x	Ï	
x},	 but	 in	 some	 paraconsistent	 set	 theories,	 this	 set	 is	 legitimate	 (da	 Costa,	 Krause	 and	Bueno	 [2007]).	 It	 can	 be	 proved,	 in	 ZFC,	 that	 there	 are	 sets	 that	 are	 not	 Lebesgue	measurable,	but	in	“Solovay	set	theory”	all	sets	are	Lebesgue	measurable	(Maitland	Wright	[1973]).	 What	 is	 remarkable	 is	 that	 all	 these	 set	 theories	 invoke	 the	 same	 theory	 of	identity,	namely,	CTI.	Thus,	our	considerations	apply	to	all	of	them.		It	 is	undeniable	 that	set	 theory	 is	 the	most	widely	used	basis	 for	standard	mathematics,	that	is,	the	part	of	mathematics	that	can	be	developed	in	theories	such	as	ZFC.	This	is	also	the	 mathematics	 that	 underlies	 quantum	 theories.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 unclear	 what	 kind	 of	quantum	mechanics	could	be	developed	in	a	system	such	as	NF,	given	its	incompatibility	
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with	 the	 axiom	 of	 choice	 (AC).	 After	 all,	 AC	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 usual	 mathematical	formulation	 of	 quantum	mechanics,	 so	 that	 it	 can	 be	 guaranteed,	 for	 instance,	 that	 the	relevant	Hilbert	spaces	have	a	basis.	(Of	course,	quantum	mechanics	can	be	developed	in	many	 different	 ways	 that	 need	 not	 rely	 on	 von	 Neumann’s	 approach;	 see	 Styer	 et	 al.	[2002].)		It	 is	a	remarkable	fact,	we	noted,	that	in	all	of	these	set-theoretic	frameworks,	all	objects	
are	 individuals,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 all	 of	 them	 have	 identity.	 In	 other	 words,	 given	 any	objects	(that	is,	any	sets;	the	case	of	Urelemente	will	be	mentioned	soon),	there	is	always	a	way	 to	distinguish	 them,	 if	 not	 effectively,	 at	 least	 in	principle.	The	proof	 is	 immediate.	Given	a	certain	object	a,	which	is	either	a	set	or	a	Urelement,	the	postulates	of	a	set	theory	enable	 us	 to	 form	 the	 set	 {a},	 the	 singleton	 of	 a.	 (As	 is	well	 known,	 there	 are	 pure	 set	theories,	 containing	 only	 sets,	 and	 impure	 set	 theories,	 systems	 that	 also	 include	
atoms¾the	Urelemente	in	the	original	Cantor’s	terminology.	These	atoms	are	not	sets	but	can	be	elements	of	sets.)	Define	the	“property”	Ida(x)	=:	x	Î	{a}.	The	only	object	that	has	such	a	property	is	a	itself,	so	a	has	at	least	one	property	distinguishing	it	from	any	other	object.	Leibniz	law	applies	and,	thus,	there	cannot	be	indistinguishable	but	non-identical	objects.		Indiscernible	entities	can	be	accommodated	in	a	set	theory	via	equivalence	relations.	The	elements	of	an	equivalent	class	can	be	 taken	as	representing	the	same	object,	but	 this	 is	clearly	a	mathematical	trick	and	does	not	work	as	part	of	a	philosophically	well-motivated	proposal.	A	trick	similar	to	this	is	used	in	orthodox	quantum	mechanics	when	symmetric	and	 anti-symmetric	 wave-functions	 are	 chosen	 to	 stand	 for	 certain	 quantum	 systems:	functions	 are	 selected	 that	 do	 not	 alter	 the	 probabilities	 when	 particle	 labels	 are	exchanged.	 (This	 trick	was	called	“Weyl’s	strategy”	since	 it	was	used	by	Hermann	Weyl;	see	French	and	Krause	[2006],	§6.5.1.)		As	a	result,	within	standard	mathematics,	there	are	no	absolutely	indiscernible	objects	as	quantum	objects	are	said	to	be	in	certain	situations.	Thus,	if	we	use	standard	mathematics	in	our	preferred	formulation	of	quantum	mechanics	 (the	same	point	applies	 to	quantum	field	theories),	from	the	simple	fact	that	there	are	two	quantum	objects,	it	results	from	the	mathematics	 alone	 that	 the	objects	 are	different	 (they	 are	not	 identical),	 and	by	Leibniz	law,	there	is	at	least	one	property	that	one	of	them	has	and	the	other	does	not.	However,	if	the	 objects	 in	 question	 are	 indiscernible,	 such	 as	 two	 bosons	 in	 the	 same	 state,	 which	property	would	 that	be?	The	assumption	of	the	existence	of	such	a	property	amounts	to	the	 introduction	of	hidden	variables¾even	 in	those	 formulations	of	quantum	mechanics	that	do	not	accept	them.	But	that	there	is	such	a	property	follows	from	Leibniz	law	(which,	as	 noted,	 is	 part	 of	 the	 package	 formed	 by	 classical	 mathematics,	 which	 includes	 a	corresponding	logic,	and	the	standard	theory	of	identity).	Thus,	in	any	situation,	given	two	quantum	objects,	there	is	a	difference	between	them.	Such	a	difference	cannot	be	given	by	a	 substratum	 (a	 haecceity)	 since	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 a	 substratum	 is	 ruled	 out	 in	quantum	 theories	 (see	 Teller	 [1998]).	 The	 difference	 can	 be	 expressed	 in	 terms	 of	 a	bundle	 theory	of	properties,	which	 leads	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 there	 is	 a	property	 that	only	one	of	the	quantum	objects	in	question	have,	but	not	the	other.	The	problems	is	that	according	 to	quantum	theories,	assuming	 their	usual	 interpretations,	 this	 is	not	a	viable	possibility.	Otherwise,	quantum	objects	would	be	discernible.	In	the	end,	what	is	needed	is	a	framework	that	does	not	preclude	the	possibility	of	indiscernible	but	potentially	distinct	systems	of	entities,	a	framework	that	makes	room	for	non-individuals.		An	appropriate,	philosophically	well-motivated,	strategy	would	then	be	to	leave	standard	set	theories	behind	and	adopt	a	set	theory	in	which	identity	is	not	taken	to	hold	in	general,	namely,	 a	 quasi-set	 theory.	 This	 is	 a	 mathematical	 framework	 which	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	metamathematics	 for	quantum	theories	(see	French	and	Krause	 [2006],	Domenech	et	al.	
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[2008],	and	Krause	and	Arenhart	[forthcoming]).	In	this	theory,	collections	(called	quasi-
sets)	 can	 be	 formed	 by	 absolutely	 indiscernible	 elements	 without	 thereby	 becoming	identical.	As	a	result,	Leibniz	law	is	violated	for	some	objects	(although	it	remains	valid	for	another	 kind	 of	 objects,	 called	 classical).	 These	 collections	 of	 indiscernible	 entities	 can	have	a	cardinal,	 called	its	quasi-cardinal,	 even	 if	 they	do	not	have	an	ordinal.	The	 theory	provides	a	 framework	 to	 examine	 collections	of	 objects	without	ordering	 them,	without	identifying	or	 individuating	 them.	And	differently	 from	classical	 set	 theories,	 the	 theory	offers	 a	 framework	 in	which	non-individuals	 can	be	 formulated	 and	 thoroughly	 studied	without	the	incoherence	found	in	the	use	of	classical	set	theories	for	the	formulation	of	the	foundations	 of	 quantum	 mechanics.	 (For	 details,	 see	 French	 and	 Krause	 [2006],	 and	Krause	and	Arenhart	[forthcoming].)	We	conclude	this	work	by	noting	the	significance	of	foundational	studies	of	physics,	of	which	quasi-set	theories	provide	a	clear	case.		
5.	Conclusion		In	this	paper,	the	metaphysical	underpinnings	of	the	idea	that	quantum	entities	are	non-individuals	have	been	examined.	Schrödinger’s	claim	that	identity	does	not	make	sense	for	quantum	 entities	 was	 interpreted,	 and	 the	 connections	 between	 this	 claim	 and	 some	issues	 related	 to	 continuous	 trajectories	 in	 quantum	 theory	 were	 investigated.	 The	resulting	metaphysics	of	non-individuals	assumes	a	tight	connection	between	identity	and	individuality,	 so	 that	 if	 individuality	 has	 to	 go,	 so	does	 identity.	 Given	 that	 identity	 is	 a	logical	 relation,	which	 is	part	of	classical	mathematics,	and	since	almost	every	system	of	logic	has	a	version	with	identity,	it	is	important	to	provide	an	account	of	what	it	is	like	for	a	system	of	logic	to	have	no	identity.	A	few	more	words	on	the	importance	of	developing	such	formalisms	and	their	relation	with	physics	are,	thus,	in	order.		First,	consider	some	reasons	to	look	for	alternative	mathematics	(and	logic)	for	quantum	mechanics.	 Leaving	 aside	 historical	 considerations	 (an	 up-to-date	 analysis,	 which	 also	considers	some	historical	facts,	can	be	found	in	Maudlin	[2018]),	the	motivation	has	to	do	with	 the	 foundations	of	physics.	One	 could	argue	 that	physics	works	 fine	with	 standard	(Leibnizian)	 mathematics	 (and	 logic),	 as	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 by	 considering	 any	 book	 on	quantum	mechanics.	In	particular,	the	argument	goes,	questions	about	the	foundations	of	physics	could	be	regarded	as	“mere	philosophical”	problems	that,	on	their	own,	contribute	nothing	to	the	clear	understanding	of	physics.	That	this	view	is	untenable	becomes	clear	by	considering	some	of	the	papers	in	Cao	[1999],	and	the	significant	insights	that	a	careful	reflection	 on	 the	 foundations	 of	 physics	 provides.	 (For	 the	 sake	 of	 brevity,	 we	 will	 not	revisit	the	various	arguments	here.)		It	could	be	argued	that	something	similar	happens	with	current	physical	theories.	Current	physics	works	fine	with	two	incompatible	theories,	namely,	the	Standard	Model	of	particle	physics	 and	 general	 relativity.	 The	 former	 provides	 the	 best	 way	 developed	 so	 far	 to	account	for	the	physics	of	the	small,	while	the	latter	offers	the	best	physics	of	the	big,	as	it	were.	One	or	the	other	is	applied	depending	on	the	subject	matter	under	study.	However,	these	 two	theories	are	 logically	 incompatible	with	one	another,	 for	gravity	has	not	been	quantized.	Should	the	situation	be	left	at	that,	with	everyone	being	encouraged	to	accept	that	physics	has	reached	its	final	limit	and	no	unification	is	ultimately	necessary?		Of	 course	 not.	 Novelties	 have	 always	 emerged	 when	 foundational	 issues	 have	 been	pursued.	In	mathematics,	this	is	undeniably	the	case,	as	the	development	of	logic	and	set	theory	clearly	 illustrates.	There	 is	no	reason	to	 think	 that	quantum	mechanics	would	be	any	different.	Indeed,	the	relevance	of	string	theories,	loop	gravity,	and	any	other	attempt	to	 find	 a	more	 fundamental	 theory,	 in	 particular	 the	 quantization	 of	 gravity,	 cannot	 be	appreciated	 without	 acknowledging	 the	 significance	 of	 foundational	 research.	 In	 fact,	
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without	 the	 latter,	 it	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	make	 sense	 of	 why	 physicists	 systematically	pursue	such	enterprises.		To	look	for	more	suitable	mathematical	bases	for	a	coherent	metaphysical	conception	of	quantum	 objects	 as	 non-individuals	 is	 reasonable	 and	 even	 necessary	 (to	 prevent	inconsistencies).	 Arguably,	 no	 one	 seems	 to	 know,	 and	 perhaps	 no	 one	will	 ever	 know,	what	quantum	entities	ultimately	are.	All	one	has	are	one’s	theories.	Even	the	concept	of	
particle	changes	from	theory	to	theory	(see	Falkenburg	[2007],	Chapter	6).	Foundational	research	provides	 some	perspective	 and	 insight	 to	pursue	 the	 search	 for	understanding	that	is	integral	to	the	attempt	of	making	sense	of	these	issues	as	well	as	their	significance.		This	brings	the	second	topic	to	be	addressed	here:	ontology.	Physicists,	in	general,	have	a	broad	and	 intuitive	 idea	of	what	ontology	is,	but	some	of	 them	do	not	 find	 it	 relevant	 to	their	work	in	physics.	Ontology,	it	was	noted,	is	traditionally	occupied	with	what	there	is	(in	the	world),	with	existential	questions,	such	as:	“Are	there	winged	horses?”,	“Are	there	electrons?”,	 “Are	 there	 transcendental	 numbers?”.	 Metaphysics	 is	 more	 general	 and	includes	 ontology	 as	 a	 proper	 part.	 For	 instance,	 Democritus’	 claim	 that	 the	 world	 is	composed	by	atoms	(indivisibles)	is	a	metaphysical	view.	It	concerns	the	basic	structures	of	 the	 world.	 Even	 in	 classical	 logic	 one	 finds	 metaphysical	 assumptions.	 For	 example,	classical	propositional	logic	assumes	a	metaphysical,	semantic	principle	to	the	effect	that	the	 truth	of	a	complex	 formula	depends	on	 the	 truth	of	 its	component	 formulas,	usually	referred	to	as	Frege’s	Principle	of	Compositionality	(Szabó	[2017]).		Physics	 is	 not	 different	 and	 it	 also	 has	 its	 share	 of	 metaphysical	 claims.	 One	 of	 them,	crucial	to	the	entire	discussion	examined	in	this	work,	is	that	quantum	objects¾whether	they	 are	 particles	 in	 orthodox	 quantum	mechanics	 or	 field	 excitations	 in	 quantum	 field	theories¾are	 ultimately	 non-individuals.	 This	 claim,	 of	 course,	 does	 not	 force	 us	 to	assume	 that	 non-individuals	 exist.	 Situations	 can	be	 presented	 in	 a	 conditional	 form:	 if	there	 are	 things	 like	 quantum	 entities,	 then	 they	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 non-individuals.	This	process	of	interpretation,	 itself	an	integral	part	of	foundational	research,	provides	a	possible	approach	to	the	understanding	of	the	nature	of	such	entities.		Just	 to	 be	 clear,	 we	 are	 not	 asserting	 that	 quantum	 objects	 are	 non-individuals.	 It	 is	unclear	 how	 this	 claim	 could	 be	 established.	 Rather,	 the	 goal	 is	 to	 develop	 the	 view	 as	coherently	 as	 possible	 and	 indicate	 how	 it	 helps	 one	 understand	 quantum	 entities.	Bohmian	 mechanics	 (BM)	 works	 with	 a	 ‘classical’	 metaphysics	 involving	 ‘classical’	individuals,	each	one	having	their	own	identity.	But	Bohmians	should	also	be	careful	and	acknowledge	that	their	hypothesis	is	just	a	hypothesis,	a	metaphysical	view	among	several	others.	 The	 physics	 works	 fine	 with	 BM,	 at	 least	 at	 the	 level	 of	 its	 non-relativistic	counterpart	 (we	 make	 no	 commitment	 regarding	 relativistic	 BM).	 Clearly,	 Bohmian	mechanics	provides	an	additional	example	of	the	significance	of	foundational	research.		To	 conclude,	 placed	 in	 classical	 metaphysics	 and	 in	 standard	 underlying	 mathematics	(based	on	ZFC),	quantum	objects	cannot	be	completely	indiscernible.	The	resulting	theory	can	provide	predictions	of	quantum	phenomena,	such	as	 in	the	 two-slit	experiment	(see	Holland	 [2010]),	 but	 these	 are	 just	 predictions	 able	 to	 make	 the	 physics	 work.	 The	problem,	 however,	 is	 the	 logic	 that	 is	 being	 invoked	 is	 inconsistent	 with	 the	indiscernibility	 of	 the	 phenomena	 in	 question.	 Quantum	 statistics,	 Gibbs	 paradox,	 and	many	 other	 quantum	 phenomena	 presuppose	 absolute	 indiscernibility.	 As	 Wiczek	 and	Devine	 have	 said,	 “in	 the	 microworld,	 we	 need	 uniformity	 of	 a	 strong	 kind:	 complete	indistinguishability”	(Wilczek	and	Devine	[1987],	p.	135).	So,	from	a	logical	point	of	view,	predictions	are	not	enough:	one	need	a	proper	foundational	mathematical	framework.	The	commitment	that	classical	logic	and	standard	mathematics	have	to	Leibniz	law	questions	
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their	 adequacy	 to	 accommodate,	 in	 a	 proper	 way,	 truly	 indistinguishable	 things.	 A	different	path	is	then	called	for.		
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